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Mattes: CASE FOR CHARACTER

A CASE FOR CHARACTER: Towards
a Lutheran Virtue Ethics. By Joel D.
Biermann. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014.
204 pages. Paper. $29.00.
This volume culminates work that
Joel Biermann has done in response to the
antinomianism which he thinks is prevalent in Lutheranism today. Of course, it
is hard to determine whether it is legalism or libertinism which has the upper
hand in today’s church: in various circles
we encounter one or the other. Rightly
distinguishing law and gospel helps us to
avoid both legalism and libertinism. In
response to legalism: we look no longer
to the law but instead to Christ for our
righteousness before God. In response to
libertinism: since we have died to sin, we
no longer seek to live in sin.
Biermann proposes that Christian
leaders promote the virtues of courage, wisdom, moderation, and justice,
in preaching and catechesis. He urges
that preachers and teachers should not
shy away from Christian ethical instruction (parenesis), as if avoiding paranesis
is faithful to the law and gospel distinction; indeed, people are seeking wisdom
for how to live. The fact that “Christ
is the end of the law” (Rom 10:3‒4) in
no way rules out the law as guidance for
Christian living; instead what it rules out
is all self-righteousness before God. Our
neighbors benefit from our righteousness in the world. Indeed, the pattern in
Romans, as in other Pauline epistles, is
that paranesis (Rom 12‒15) invariably follows after the gospel (Rom 3:21‒Rom 8).
Biermann expands on the work of Robert
Kolb who noted: “Believers strive, under
the Spirit’s guidance, to put to death the
vices that spring from their need to secure

life on their own terms. They repent—are
turned by the Holy Spirit—from vices
to virtues as God uses them as his masks.
They strive to practice those attitudes and
actions that reflect the image of God’s
love, care, and concern into the lives of
others. They do so in every situation of
human life.”1
Biermann looks to philosophers such
as Alasdair MacIntyre who offer Aristotlebased “virtue ethics,” as an alternative
to “quandary ethics” (ethical problems
which have no clear resolution) in which
modern ethical theories, whether dutybased (deontology) or outcome-based
(utilitarianism), are mired. In addition to MacIntyre, Biermann appeals
to the Methodist theologian Stanley
Hauerwas, and several contemporary
Lutherans, to defend virtue ethics. He
shows that this approach can be found in
Luther, Melanchthon, and the Lutheran
Confessions. His own proposal reworks
the traditional “three uses of the law,”
countering those who reduce the uses of
the law to two (which Biermann finds
inherently antinomian), by advocating
three kinds of righteousness: 1) the law
governs in the wider political community
(righteousness applying to all regardless of
one’s status with God); 2) the gospel justifies sinners through an alien righteousness
given to people of faith; and 3) the law
guides believers to conform their lives to
God’s will (righteousness evident in godly
living and good works). Each of these
functions of the law corresponds to each
of the articles of the Creed. Biermann’s
constructive work is persuasive, but there
are some questions that should be raised.
First, in the Bible, all paranesis is
done apart from Aristotle. The scriptures refer to virtue, but they lack an
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Aristotelian grounding for it. Instead,
Wisdom literature distinguishes between
wise and foolish behavior, while the prophetic tradition calls for fidelity to the
covenant. New Testament parenesis is
indebted to both. So, one can do parenesis
without Aristotle. But, if that is the case,
should Aristotle be baptized? If he should,
doesn’t he need to undergo some catechesis first?
After all, there is no commensurability between the pride that Aristotle advocates for a well-lived life (Nichomachean
Ethics 4:3) and the humility advocated
by Paul (Philippians 2). Aristotelian virtue ethics are grounded in how human
nature is furthered through excellence
(doing the Golden Mean) as opposed
to vices of excess or defect. In general,
Biermann’s case would be stronger if he
would articulate the rapport between
Aristotle’s eudaimonism, that is, selffulfillment through exercising character
traits of excellence and biblical humility.
How does this eudaimonism square with
the fact that believers have been crucified
with Christ and that they no longer live
for themselves, but instead Christ lives in
them (Gal 2:20)? Many who deny a “third
use of the law” deny a “continuously existing self.” Possibly Biermann could look to
early Christians, such as Augustine, who
did not jettison ancient virtue ethics as
pagan but instead reworked them to focus
on love and service.
Biermann notes of Aristotle’s eudaimonia: “It is a deep, steady, settled happiness that endures. Aristotle was no
hedonist. He understood this kind of
happiness to be ‘activity in accordance
with virtue,’ the best of which was the ‘life
according to reason,’ or the contemplative
life.” He goes on to say: “Based not on

human reason, but on divine revelation,
the creed provides a profoundly more
fundamental, truthful, encompassing, and
even practical telos than Aristotle’s insightful yet reason-bound conclusions” (155).
But, the tension cannot be smoothed over
so quickly. Admittedly, Aristotle was not
arguing that humans should do excellence
for the sake of achieving happiness, but
instead that happiness is a natural payoff
when humans perform excellently. It may
be that Biermann thinks that Christian
virtue ethics are not so different from
Frederick Buechner’s view of vocation:
“The place God calls you to is the place
where your deep gladness and the world’s
deep hunger meet.” But if that’s the case,
that should be explained.
Second, one reason that Aristotle
lacked appreciation for the humility so
central to Paul, Christ, and the entire
scriptures, is that God’s people were in
fact repeatedly humbled by God as a
consequence of their sins, or, because at
times, God is hidden (deus absconditus).
In the Old Testament, God’s people
experienced oppression beneath a parade
of empires. Only rarely did God’s people
have the upper hand. Mary’s words,
“[God] has put down the mighty from
their thrones and exalted those of low
degree” (Lk 1:52), present the whole
life of God’s people. Aristotle cannot
appreciate that. This is said not to denigrate the use of Aristotle in ethics but to
urge Biermann to fill out the details of
the compatibility between scripture and
Aristotle which he thinks is possible.
What must be said is that the “new obedience” is a cruciform life, one in which
Christians are being conformed to the
image of Christ precisely through the trials they undergo. That is, “the entire life
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of believers” is “to be one of repentance”
Mattes: CASE FOR CHARACTER
coram deo sinners indeed turn from
(LW 31:25).
virtue to grace and receive a passive life
Third, Biermann’s case could be
(vita passiva) as the
strengthened if he would capitalize on
early Luther outlined it; but, through
MacIntyre’s notion of “narrative idencoram mundo such a grace-filled life
tity,” that human identity is storyexpresses itself in virtue exercised not
shaped, as a way to see how God is
for self-justification but for the sake
working through the scriptures to shape
of service.
characMark Mattes
ter. Christian imaginations are guided
Grand ViewUniversity
by, and not merely motivated by, scripDes Moines, Iowa
1 Robert Kolb, The Christian Faith: A
ture. The ethical question is, as Bruno
Lutheran Exposition (St. Louis: Concordia
Bettelheim puts it, who do I want to be
Publishing House, 1993), 248.
like? Saturated in the scriptures, believers
acquire the courage of Elijah, the
patience of Moses, the humility of Mary,
and the wisdom of Christ. While Luther
appeals
to the “spontaneity” of good works, in
fact this spontaneity is a result of the
word’s power to shape believers by
por- traying the realities that very
word gives
as believers internalize Scripture’s
history, wisdom, and prophecy.
Thereby, Christ
is not only “sacrament” but also
“exam- ple.” The Scriptures guide
believers in
the virtues of Christ-likeness as they
grow in knowledge of the Scriptures.
True Christian virtue is not a project in
self- enhancement. The self is ever and
only grounded in Christ. Freed from
securing and protecting the self, one can
actually start doing significant good in the
world—fulfilling the human telos to love
God with all one’s heart and one’s
neigh- bor as oneself, in which Luther
notes that we do “make some progress”
in this life.
Over all, Biermann’s contribution
is significant, timely, and a
remarkable achievement that will alter
current dis- cussions of ethics among
Lutherans and other Christians. In
light of his work, we can conclude that
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